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Abstract
Traditional data sources for the analysis of housing markets show several limi-
tations, that recently started to be overcome using data coming from housing sales
advertisements (ads) websites. In this paper, using a large dataset of ads in Italy,
we provide the first comprehensive analysis of the problems and potential of these
data. The main problem is that multiple ads (“duplicates”) can correspond to the
same housing unit. We show that this issue is mainly caused by sellers’ attempt
to increase visibility of their listings. Duplicates lead to misrepresentation of the
volume and composition of housing supply, but this bias can be corrected by iden-
tifying duplicates with machine learning tools. We then focus on the potential of
these data. We show that the timeliness, granularity, and online nature of these
data allow monitoring of housing demand, supply and liquidity, and that the (ask-
ing) prices posted on the website can be more informative than transaction prices.
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1 Introduction
The lack of comprehensive data on housing transactions has so far represented a limit
to our understanding of the housing market. Microdata on home sales are available
to researchers only in a few countries and, unfortunately, many of these sources show
limitations in the spatial or in the temporal dimension. Moreover, most of the time
microdata on home sales come from administrative datasets, for which information is
not collected for statistical purposes, but to enforce tax payments and property rights.1
Even more challenging is finding comprehensive information about homes and the full
history of housing transactions, from the time a dwelling enters the market up the actual
transaction.2
More recently, online data from marketplace websites (such as Zillow or Trulia in
the US, or Zoopla in the UK) started filling some gaps. From these sources we can
retrieve detailed information about characteristics of each housing unit and their precise
location. We know how long homes have been listed on the market, and we have a broad
picture of housing supply at each point in time. Most importantly, online listing data
provide additional information useful to analyze the housing market, such as buyers’
search behavior (Piazzesi, Schneider and Stroebel, 2020). Finally, online listings are
available in real time, allowing a more timely estimation of house price indexes (Anenberg
and Laufer, 2017).
Although the potential of online listings data for policy and research is enormous,
across all fields of economics, several concerns about data quality arise. First, online
listings may well fail to provide universal coverage, and so lead to non-representative
results. Second, these data are less structured and controlled than administrative data,
and there might be hidden factors influencing the generation of the data. Finally, online
data could have other sorts of measurement errors, mostly if compiled by hand.
In this paper we present new evidence about the potential of online home listing data
and the trade offs that analysts may face when using these data. Some drawbacks are
already well-known: listing data provide no information about sale prices and about what
caused a delisting, i.e. if a home has been sold or withdrawn. Our first contribution is to
show that there can be other limitations in the quality of these data that may introduce
severe measurement issues. Up to our knowledge, this is the first work that performs a
comprehensive analysis of the reliability and representativeness of online home listings.
After discussing drawbacks, our second contribution is to discuss some novel applications
of these data, highlighting how they can complement traditional statistical sources.
We analyze a database containing housing sales advertisements (ads) published on
Immobiliare.it, the most popular online portal for real-estate services in Italy. The data
cover the period from January 2015 up to December 2018 and include sales offers of
residential units in 109 cities. We observe the history of about 1.4 millions ads at a
weekly frequency, from the time they were created up to the time they were removed
1One of the most popular administrative datasets on home sales is the Multiple Listing Service (MLS)
database for the US housing market. However, most studies using MLS focused on a few Metropolitan
Statistical Areas only, due to the lack of a centralized MLS. In Italy, administrative microdata on
housing transactions are not available for research because of privacy concerns. The UK is one of the few
countries where microdata are timely available, but those data contain poor information about physical
characteristics of homes.
2 Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004) provide one of the most complete analyses on the full history
of housing transactions. However, because their data are hand-collected from real estate agents, their
sample size is extremely limited: 780 housing units.
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from the website. Overall, the database contains almost 28 million records.
Although this work is based on Italian data only, the same issues encountered in our
analysis affect online listings in other countries, as most of the home listings websites
across countries are very similar. Marketplace websites provide a platform where sellers
or brokers can post their offers, with no strict control on what is published. In the case
of the housing market, this is problematic because multiple brokers can intermediate the
same good. The owner of a home can entrust several real estate agencies for the sale
of her dwelling and each of these agencies could publish a different ad. Thus, there can
be multiple ads referring to the same dwelling. The drawback of duplicate ads is that
they can make online listings non-representative of the housing supply, especially if the
number of ads associated to each dwelling is not randomly distributed. As a consequence,
the lack of strict control of what is published calls for cautiousness in the use of online
listing data, especially in countries where open mandates to sell with multiple agencies
are a relevant feature of the housing market.3
To quantitatively assess the measurement error associated with the use of these data,
we employ machine learning algorithms to identify and remove duplicate ads, so as to
group all listings referring to the same home. We resort to machine learning tools because
we have found that using simple heuristic rules based on the location and similarity in
physical characteristics provides imprecise classification. The share of listed homes that
have been associated to one unique ad for all the listing period is 77 percent. Only 15
percent of listed homes have been brokered by more than one real estate agent, but these
homes represent 35 percent of all ads.
After removing duplicate ads, we show that online listings provide information consis-
tent with existing statistical sources. Duplicates introduce a severe measurement error,
especially for local housing markets. Moreover, duplicates are not randomly distributed
among listed homes. The propensity to post multiple ads increases when the asking price
is relatively high and, more generally, home sellers face weak demand for their homes. By
posting multiple ads, home sellers can immediately increase the visibility of their homes,
although this effect is only temporary. Home sellers and brokers increase their effort in
advertising when homes are relatively unattractive.
Once we have shown how it is possible to increase the reliability of online listing data,
we focus on their potential for the analysis of the housing market. We consider three
applications, namely how online listings can be used to assess the evolution of demand,
supply and house prices.
As a proxy of demand, we consider the number of visits to the webpage of each ad
during each week.4 When individuals visit the webpage of an ad, they convey information
about the characteristics, the location and the price of the home they are searching for. By
aggregating all this information, we can understand which area households are searching
more intensely and what they are looking for. We provide evidence that online interest
indeed proxies housing demand. At micro (dwelling) level, high online interest predicts
a lower time on market and a lower probability that a downward revision of the asking
price occurs. By aggregating the number of page views we can build a measure of market
tightness: we show that this indicator is a good predictor of market liquidity and house
3 Usually, the main source of profits for home listings websites are the fees paid by the users to publish
their ads. For this reason, these website have no incentive to check if multiple ads refer to the same
dwelling.
4This proxy is complementary to web searches, which have for example been used recently by Piazzesi,
Schneider and Stroebel (2020).
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prices, as suggested by the recent literature (Carrillo, de Wit and Larson, 2015; Wu and
Brynjolfsson, 2015; van Dijk and Francke, 2017).5
Online listings also make it possible to reconsider the standard definition of housing
supply. This is usually defined as the total stock of homes (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2018),
and according to this definition a change in housing supply is only due to new construc-
tions. While this definition may be most appropriate for long-run analyses, we think
that it is misleading in the short-medium run and would hide relevant housing market
facts. For example, we show that households take market conditions into account before
deciding whether to put their home up for sale. In particular, the quality of listed ex-
isting homes, as proxied by some physical characteristics, improves with better market
conditions. This is consistent with Ngai and Sheedy (2020), who show that household
decision to move house is affected by general business cycle conditions, and house sales
are very correlated with listings.
Finally, we look at the potential of listings data for the assessment of the dynamics of
house prices. Home listings websites usually provide asking prices only.6 Asking prices
can be used to nowcast and forecast sale prices, but a sound estimate of the average
discount to the initial asking price is needed, because the average discount to the initial
asking price changes over time with market conditions. However, forecasting sale prices
may not be the only goal. For example, we show that asking prices may be a more robust
indicator of the timing of the house price cycle than sale prices. Indeed, sale prices
are more volatile in the short run, mostly because of the relative small number of sales
compared to listings, and this hinders their ability to identify turning points in real time.
At the opposite, we provide evidence that asking prices are a more suitable indicator for
this task, since they are more stable and more timely.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Immobiliare.it ads dataset,
introducing the issue of duplicate ads. In Section 3 we describe how we create the final
dataset of housing units, and we validate our dataset by comparing it with the official
statistical sources available. In Section 4 we illustrate the distortions introduced by
duplicate ads. Finally, in Section 5 we show how online listing data can be used to
measure demand, supply and house prices. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
We analyze a dataset of home listings published on Immobiliare.it, the largest online
portal for real-estate services in Italy. This dataset covers the full country. Because small
towns and villages may have representativeness issues, we only consider listings in the
109 main cities that are capitals of the NUTS-3 Italian regions. About 18 million people
live in these cities, and the number of home sales is about one-third of all transactions in
Italy.
Immobiliare.it provides us with weekly snapshots of all ads visible on their website
every Monday, since 2016, January 4 until 2018, December 31. For 2015 only quarterly
5We presented the results about demand in a previous publication (Pangallo and Loberto, 2018). We
still find it useful to report them here, both because that publication was directed at a very different
audience, and because the results reported in this paper are valid for a time span that is twice as long,
highlighting robustness of our findings.
6In a few countries such as Netherlands and Denmarks, both asking and transaction prices can be
available because the online portals are owned by associations of real estate agencies.
4
snapshots are available.7
For each ad we have detailed information about physical characteristics and exact
location of the dwelling (see Appendix A for the complete list of variables). We keep
track of all variations concerning asking prices and the number of times that the webpage
of the ad has been visited (clicks). We also know the date when the ad was created and
the date when it was removed. Unfortunately, as usual with listing data, we do not know
if an ad has been removed because the home was sold or withdrawn from the market.
The dataset counts 1,402,798 ads. Since we observe ads at weekly frequency, the total
number of records is almost 28 millions. Most ads remain unchanged between two weekly
snapshots, and the average turnover is about 5%. Real estate agents post about 92% of
the ads, the others are posted by households or construction firms.
We divide the territory of each city into local housing markets using the partition de-
veloped by OMI (”microzones”),8 a branch of the Italian Tax Office. The elements of this
partition are contiguous areas of the city territory that satisfy strict requirements in terms
of homogeneity of house prices, urban characteristics, socioeconomic characteristics, as
well as endowment of services and urban infrastructures. Thus, unlike census tracts, these
microzones can be considered as “local housing markets”. For each of these microzones,
OMI provides estimates of the minimum and maximum house price per square meter on
a six-month basis. Table 8 in Appendix B reports some descriptive statistics about these
local housing markets.
Finally, we make use of information coming from the Italian Housing Market Survey,
a quarterly survey that covers a large sample of real estate agents. A detailed discussion
about all data sources can be found in Appendix A.
2.1 Duplicate listings
The main concern with marketplace websites – such as Immobiliare.it, Craigslist, Zoopla,
ImmobilienScout24 and many others – is the absence of strict control over the ads pub-
lished by the users. These websites are market platforms that allow home sellers and
brokers to advertise the sale of a housing unit in exchange for a fee. Rigorous checks on
ads published by users are costly or even unfeasible. As a consequence, online listings
may not be reliable for economic analyses.
In this paper, we assess the implications of a specific source of measurement error.
Online listings can contain a large amount of duplicate ads, i.e. multiple ads can be asso-
ciated to the same dwelling. This may be due to various reasons. First, in some countries
owners sell their home through open listing agreements. Under these agreements, two
or more real estate agents are entitled to sell the same dwelling, and each of them could
publish a different ad. Second, a real estate agency could post multiple ads for the same
home.9 Third, a mandate to sell expires, and the home seller signs a listing agreement
with a new agent. If the old agent does not immediately delete the ad, and the new agent
posts a new one, two ads for the same dwelling exist at the same time. Even if this does
7Data are available for the following days in 2015: January 5, April 25, September 7, December 28.
8This partition is periodically revised to satisfy these criteria and to better approximate local housing
markets. The last revision dates back to 2014.
9 This is a trick that real estate agencies can use to misrepresent the time on market of the listing,
and make a listing look like new. They may want to do that because potential buyers can order the
result of their search on the website from the most recently published ad to the oldest. Moreover, posting
a new ad provides greater visibility to the listing, because many potential buyers receive notifications
about new listings through the email-alert service.
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not happen and the two ads are not simultaneously visible on the website, we still need
to know that these ads refer to the same dwelling.
For a quantitative assessment of this phenomenon, for the three-year period 2016-2018
we compare the number of delistings that we observe in our dataset with the number of
home sales, provided by OMI. As can be seen in Table 1, the number of home sales
is about 60 percent of the number of delistings, with large volatility across different
cities (40% in Florence, 70% in Naples). Let us assume that each ad is associated to a
different dwelling. In this case, the share of listings ending with a sale should be lower
than 60 percent. This estimate is broadly consistent with studies on the US housing
market (Anenberg and Laufer, 2017; Carrillo and Williams, 2019) but definitely small
compared to evidence from the UK (Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 2004).10 Since our dataset
is mostly representative of home sales brokered by estate agents – that do not represent
all transactions – the assumption that each ad is associated to a different dwelling would
imply that the share of sales over all delistings could be even lower than 50 percent. We
believe that such a share of sales would be excessively low for the Italian market.
Year Delistings Sales Time on market
Listings Survey
2016 335,181 178,690 5.1 7.5
2017 312,584 186,657 4.9 6.3
2018 321,840 197,506 4.4 6.6
Table 1: Number of delistings, house sales and time on market (months). Data on sales and
time on market come from the Immobiliare.it dataset and from the OMI and Italian Housing
Market Survey (see Appendix A).
In addition to the potentially low share of sales, the average time on market computed
on listings – as the number of months between the initial listing and the delisting – is
significantly lower than the estimates provided by real estate agents in the Italian Housing
Market Survey (Table 1). Using listings implies an underestimation of about two months
for the time on market.
A plausible explanation for the potentially low share of sales and the underestimation
of the time on market is that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between ads and
housing units actually put on the market. Because of that, individual ads do not always
provide information about the full history of a home listing, and multiple ads in the
dataset can refer to the same home.
The presence of duplicate ads has two implications. First, ads provide a biased rep-
resentation of the supply, especially at granular levels. Our major concern is that the
presence of duplicates is not random but associated with the physical characteristics of
the house, the urgency of the owner to sell soon or difficulties to find a buyer. Second,
the sale of a single dwelling can be associated with several ads posted in different periods,
possibly from different intermediaries. If this second problem occurs, we cannot observe
the full history of housing sales.
More rigorous checks by website administrators about information published on the
market platform cannot solve all issues associated with online listing data, especially in
countries where open listing agreements are a relevant feature of the housing market.
10 According to Anenberg and Laufer (2017) and Carrillo and Williams (2019), in the US about half
of the delistings results in withdraws. In a sample of listings from the UK, Merlo and Ortalo-Magne
(2004) find that withdraws are about 25 percent of the delistings.
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Thus, there will always be some concern that online listings are not representative of the
actual housing market dynamics. A first contribution of this paper is to quantitatively
assess the magnitude of the resulting potential distortion.
3 Identification of home listings
We identify duplicate ads using machine learning tools. In this way, we depart from the
original dataset of ads and build a new dataset of listings, in which the unit of observation
is a home instead of an ad.
We use machine learning tools because, most of the times, we cannot identify an exact
matching between characteristics of the houses reported in two duplicate ads. In these
situations, heuristic rules imposed by the analyst fail, while machine learning algorithms
autonomously learn the best criteria that identify duplicates provided the training sample
is sufficiently large. After identifying duplicates, we combine them as if they were a single
ad.
Here we sketch the steps of the algorithm, while the details are left to Appendix C and
Loberto, Luciani and Pangallo (2018). Our approach is based on standard methodologies
adopted for data deduplication (see Naumann and Herschel, 2010; Christen, 2012), that
we adjust to better tackle the specifics of our dataset. The deduplication process consists
of three steps.
Data preparation. To identify if two ads refer to the same dwelling, we have to com-
pare locations and characteristics of the houses described in the ads. This operation is
complicated by the fact that the geographical coordinates or the address may not be
precise enough and some information is not objective, but based on the best judgment of
the home seller/broker.11
For this reason, we cannot look for a perfect matching between home characteristics
and have to build measures of partial similarity. To do that, we consider some ordered
categorical variables – such as maintenance status, for which the various categories can
be assigned an order – as numerical to meaningfully calculate the degree of similarity
between these characteristics. Overall, for numerical and ordered categorical variables,
we compute the distance between characteristics reported in the two ads. Only for binary
and categorical variables that are not ordered we look for a perfect matching between the
two ads.
The textual description of the home provided in the ad performs a dual role. First,
by using semantic analysis, information extracted from the textual description allows to
impute missing data. That is important because the best way to identify duplicates is
to retrieve from the ads as much information as possible. Second, we use the textual
description as a further variable to identify if two ads refer to the same dwelling. We
use the Paragraph Vector (or doc2vec) algorithm proposed by Le and Mikolov (2014),
in which a neural network learns about the order and semantics of words, to associate
a numeric vector to the textual description. In this way, the “distance” between two
descriptions can be measured by computing the cosine distance between the associated
vectors.
11The seller/broker of the home can identify the location on a map or, alternatively, provide the address
as an input. The fact that two different tools are available – and the lack of precision of the user – gives
rise to the possibility that the same dwelling has a slightly different geolocation in different ads. That is
not an issue in rural areas, but it is in urban areas with a high concentration of housing units.
7
Classification. We check if two ads are duplicates only if they are sufficiently close,
both in terms of geographical distance and listing price. For each of these pairs we
have to decide if the ads refer to the same housing unit. To do so, we compare the
characteristics of the dwellings described in the ads, and based on some rules we classify
them as duplicates or not duplicates.
To identify these rules we use a machine learning algorithm, the C5.0 classification
tree proposed by Quinlan (1993). This algorithm autonomously learns which variables are
most relevant to identify duplicates, once it is supplied with a sufficiently large training
sample, i.e. a dataset of pairs of ads of which we know with certainty if they are duplicates
or not. We manually constructed the training sample by looking at pairs of ads on the
website, and deciding whether the two ads refer to the same housing unit based on the
pictures of the two dwellings.
We use different classification trees, depending on whether the two ads were posted
by the same user or by different users.12 Each training sample includes about 9000 pairs
of ads, and both classification trees show a high degree of accuracy (see Table 10 in
Appendix C).
Finally, we use the classification tree for prediction. The algorithm outputs a proba-
bility that the two ads are duplicates. If this probability is larger than 0.5, we consider
the two ads as referring to the same housing unit.
Clusterization. The output of the previous step is a list of pairs of duplicate ads. Since
multiple pairs can refer to the same dwelling, we have to create clusters of all ads referring
to the same home. To do so, we use methods from graph theory and consider a cluster of
ads as referring to the same housing unit if an internal similarity condition for the cluster
is satisfied. Finally, we aggregate information coming from different ads by computing
for each variable the average or the most common feature observed across ads.
Final dataset. The number of houses – or “true” listings – is only 67 percent of the
number of ads (about 950 thousand housing units). Looking at the distribution of houses
per number of associated ads, we find that duplicates are concentrated over a small share
of houses: about 77 percent of dwellings only have one associated ad, 13 percent have
two duplicate ads, and 10 percent have more than two duplicates.
Open listing agreements with many agents seem to be a main source of duplicate
ads. To see that, consider that only 15 percent of homes were listed with more than
one agency, but these homes account for 35 percent of the ads. Conversely, 7 percent of
homes have multiple ads that were posted by the same broker. These homes account for
13 percent of the ads.
Considering a single daily snapshot, the number of listed houses is on average 87
percent of the number of ads, meaning that by taking a snapshot of the data on any
specific day we expect that only 13 percent of the ads are duplicates. These figures are
consistent with those concerning the full sample because duplicate ads for the same listed
home grow over time: new ads are created while old ads are deleted, and that gives
rise to a huge number of delistings and new listings. We find confirming evidence when
we consider only homes with multiple corresponding ads. Every week, for 90 percent of
them, at most two duplicate ads are on average visible. This figure can be compared
with the share of homes with two ads out of homes with multiple ads in the full sample,
which is 10/(10 + 13) = 57%.
12 We observed that the degree of similarity between two duplicate ads is lower when they are posted
by two different users instead of the same user.
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Finally, the share of duplicates over total ads increases with city size, and there is
significant variability across cities. For example, the ratio between the number of ads
and housing units is equal to 1.4 for Naples and 1.8 for Rome. Therefore, an additional
implication of duplicates is that they can make the comparability across cities difficult.
3.1 Validation
To validate the quality of our deduplication procedure we compare information coming
from the final dataset with other well-established statistical sources.
First, we compute the number of delistings and home sales in each city (obtained from
OMI) at quarterly frequency and we find that these two variables are strongly correlated
(Figure 1(a)): their correlation coefficient is 0.94. Notice that a delisting now represents
the effective exit of a home from the market instead of the removal of an ad from the
website. Table 2 compares the absolute number of delistings and home sales. Compared
to Table 1, the numbers seem more plausible once we take into account that not all houses
sold during these years have been listed on Immobiliare.it.
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Figure 1: Sales and prices. Listing data are shown on the horizontal axis while data coming
from official statistical sources are shown on the vertical axis.
Year Delistings Sales Time on market
Listings Survey
2016 207,120 178,690 6.7 7.5
2017 187,443 186,657 6.7 6.3
2018 189,505 197,506 6.3 6.6
Table 2: Number of delistings, house sales and time on market (months)
We find a robust correlation with official data also when we consider prices (the
correlation is 0.82; Figure 1(b)). In this case our results are even stronger, because we
have official estimates from OMI for each local housing market, so we can compare listing
prices and average home values per square meter at a finer granularity. The non-linearity
observed for very high home values is probably due to the fact that OMI estimates refer to
the average value of all houses located within the local market, while the most expensive
9
and prestigious houses are likely to be less liquid and therefore less represented among
listed houses.
Moreover, for each local housing market we compute the ratio between listing prices
and actual home values per square meter. On average, we find that during the three
years 2016-2018 the discount on asking prices was about 12%, a value consistent with the
evidence provided by the Italian Housing Market Survey.
Finally, we look at time on the market. After our deduplication procedure, listings
provide an estimate of the time on market overall consistent with the Italian Housing
Market Survey (see Table 2). We find a significant deviation only for 2016 when listings
underestimate time on market. That is plausible because that is the first year for which
we have weekly data. Some of the houses listed in 2016 may have been initially listed in
2015, but since for 2015 we only observe quarterly snapshots, it is possible that we were
not able to reconstruct the full history of these listings due to difficulties in identifying
duplicates.
Overall, information coming from our final dataset of listings is consistent with official
statistical sources. We consider this as evidence of the efficacy of our deduplication
procedure.
4 The implications of duplicate listings
The first contribution of this paper is to assess what kind of distortions are introduced by
duplicate ads. First, we quantify the measurement error introduced by duplicate ads. We
document that it is quite small when the level of data aggregation is sufficiently high, but
more serious when studying more disaggregated housing markets. Second, we show that
presence of multiple ads related to the same dwelling is not random, and home sellers or
brokers post multiple ads to attract more attention.
4.1 Measurement error
To quantify the measurement error introduced by duplicate ads we compare some statis-
tics calculated on the original dataset of ads and the final dataset of listings. We check
if the two dataset provide similar information about delistings and asking prices. We
make this comparison both at the city and local housing market level, as the measure-
ment error possibly has different magnitude depending on the level of granularity that is
considered. Average prices per square meter and delistings are averaged over quarters,
obtaining quarterly data spanning from 2016Q1 to 2018Q4.
Figures 2(a)-2(d) show the comparison for delistings and average listing prices when
the level of aggregation is the city. We find an almost perfect correlation between the two
datasets for both the number of delistings and average listing prices. When we calculate
year-on-year rates of change, however, noise is stronger but correlation is still good. The
correlation coefficients are 0.83 for asking prices and 0.68 for delistings.
Figures 3(a)-3(d) show that these correlations decrease when we consider the same
variables at the local housing market level. In particular, when we consider year-on-year
growth rates the correlation is relatively low for both variables (0.52 for transactions
and 0.68 for prices). Figures 3(b) and 3(d) show that in many cases the two datasets
provide opposite indications about the evolution of the variable of interest compared to
the previous year.
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Figure 2: Original and final dataset (cities).
Therefore, the measurement error implied by keeping duplicate listings in the sample is
sizable at granular level, in particular when we look at dynamics. However, depending on
the application at hand, the original dataset of ads can be a reliable source of information.
For example, an analyst may be interested only in the heterogeneity in prices across cities
or the geographical level of aggregation is sufficiently broad. More generally, we suggest
cautiousness in using online ads, especially in the estimation of the number of dwellings
on the market and the composition of supply.
4.2 Systematic bias
Now, we test if it is more likely to observe duplicate ads for certain houses rather than
others. In particular, we focus on two hypotheses.
Our first hypothesis is that duplicate ads are more likely among those houses for
which potential buyers show little interest, i.e. demand for these houses is relatively
small. Intuitively, home sellers would choose to increase search intensity – through open
listing agreements with multiple agencies or more generally by posting numerous ads –
to compensate the scarcity of buyers potentially interested in their houses.
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(b) Delistings (y-o-y growth rates)
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(c) Asking prices
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Figure 3: Original and final dataset (local housing markets).
Our second hypothesis is that the presence of duplicates is correlated with the listing
price. It is reasonable that houses whose listing price is too high compared to similar
nearby homes may have multiple associated ads because the seller increases his odds to
find a buyer, for example by giving the mandate to sell to several agents.
To test for these two hypotheses we use weekly data to estimate the following linear
probability model:13
DUPLijt = αjt + βCLICKSijt + γPRICEijt + δXi + εijt (1)
where DUPLijt is an indicator variable, that is equal to one if more than one ad is
associated to home i in week t; the index j refers to the local housing market in which
the home is located. CLICKSijt is average daily number of visits to the web pages
(clicks) related to dwelling i during week t.14 We show in section 5.1 that this measure
proxies housing demand. Intuitively, the most searched houses are likely to be those for
13 We use a linear probability model instead of a logit model because of computational convenience.
14 When more than one ad refer to dwelling i, CLICKS is computed in two steps. First, we compute
the average daily number of clicks for each ad. Second, we compute the mean of the daily number of
clicks across all ads.
12
which the owner or the broker receive more calls or emails by potential buyers. PRICEijt
is the listing price per square meter of dwelling i during week t. We control for spatial and
temporal heterogeneity at the local housing market level through the set of dummies αjt.
Finally, Xi is a vector with the following physical characteristics of dwelling i: floor area
(square meters), type of property (apartment, detached dwelling), floor level, number of
bathrooms, maintenance status, presence of a balcony or a terrace, garage and elevator.
Multiple ads New duplicate New duplicate New duplicate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Listing Price t 0.0198∗∗∗
(0.0011)
Clicks t −0.1221∗∗∗ 0.4068∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0008)
Clicks t− 1 −0.0015∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.1816∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0008)
Clicks t− 2 −0.0429∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Clicks t− 3 −0.0211∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Clicks t− 4 −0.0154∗∗∗
(0.0007)
Clicks t+ 1 −0.0156∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Clicks t+ 2 −0.0559∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Clicks t+ 3 −0.0299∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Clicks t+ 4 −0.0310∗∗∗
(0.0007)
Listing Price t− 1 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Listing Price t− 4 0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0002)
Fixed effects OMI microzone + OMI microzone + OMI microzone + OMI microzone +
week week week week
Observations 16,042,720 15,450,398 14,374,903 11,330,074
Adjusted R2 0.0036 0.0004 0.0004 0.0231
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors reported in the Table have been multiplied by 100.
Table 3: Determinants of duplicates
Column (1) in Table 3 reports the results of our estimation. The coefficients associated
with CLICKS and PRICE are statistically significant, and their sign confirms our initial
hypotheses. The presence of multiple ads is associated with low interest by potential
buyers, and a relatively higher listing price. Although we cannot claim any causal relation
based on model (1), the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the home seller
increases his effort to find a buyer to compensate for a high asking price or unattractive
characteristics of the home.
To identify a causal effect of demand and listing prices on the propensity to post
multiple ads, we create a new indicator variable called NEWDUPL. This variable is
equal to one if the number of ads associated with a home already on the market increases
13
during week t. Then, we estimate the following linear probability model:
NEWDUPLijt = αjt + βCLICKSijt−1 + γPRICEijt−1 + δXi + ζzit + εijt (2)
Compared to (1), we take as regressors the one-week lag for both demand and listing
price. This model allows us to test if the propensity of the home seller or the broker
to increase advertising during week t by posting a new ad is affected by asking price
and buyers’ demand during the previous week. We also control for the number of days
dwelling i has been listed up to week t (zit).
Column (2) in Table 3 shows that our previous results are qualitatively confirmed. The
propensity to post a new ad for a previously listed home decreases when online interest
for that home goes up; this propensity is also increasing in the listing price. Notice that
these coefficients are statistically significant although we include many controls and the
phenomenon we are considering is not very frequent at weekly frequency. In particular,
the unconditional probability that during week t a new ad is posted for a previously listed
home is 0.9 percent.
In this regression, clicks can be considered as exogenous because potential buyers
cannot know the sellers’ strategies a week in advance. Moreover, since we control for the
listing price and dwellings characteristics, we deduce that the lower online attention is
determined not only by an excessively high price asked by the seller but by a genuine
mismatch with potential buyers’ preferences. Unfortunately, we cannot resort to this
argument to claim that the lagged value of the listing price is exogenous. Indeed, home
sellers/brokers set both the listing price and the advertising strategy, and when changing
the listing price they can have already decided to post a new ad. However, we show in
column (3) that replacing the one-week lagged listing price with the four-weeks lag, we
still find a positive and significant effect on the propensity to post a new ad.
Finally, after having shown that the listings that receive little online attention are
those with the highest probability of having multiple ads, we want to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of this advertising strategy. To do that, we estimate the following extension of
model (2):
NEWDUPLijt = αjt +
4∑
i=−4
βiCLICKSijt−i + γPRICEijt−1 + δXi + ζzit + εijt (3)
where we add as regressors the contemporaneous value of the variable CLICKS and all
its lags and leads up to four weeks. The results are reported in column (4) in Table 3.
We find that during the four weeks before the seller posts a new ad, his home gets a
relatively poor online interest (βi < 0 for i = −1,−2,−3,−4). Clicks are low especially
in the previous week (β−1). Then, following the publication of the new ad, a spike in
clicks occurs (β0 > 0). That happens because potential buyers may believe that this is a
new listing. Home buyers may not easily recognize that the new ad refers to a previously
listed house, and this is especially true when a new broker posts the ad. However, this
positive effect is only temporary: In the following four weeks, online attention returns to
relatively low levels again (βi < 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4).
The main conclusion is that using the original dataset of ads implies an oversampling
of houses relative expensive – given their location and characteristics – and less attractive.
An implication is that by using ads we incur into the overestimation of the average level of
the listing prices. Moreover, houses with multiple ads show further systematic differences
compared to other dwellings. We estimate the OLS regression of time on market over a
14
dummy taking value one if a home had multiple ads, and we find that those with many
ads stay longer on the market (see Table 4). We also estimated a linear probability model
where the dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if the home seller
revised downward the initial asking price, and zero otherwise. As expected, it is more
plausible to observe a price change for houses with multiple ads (Table 4). These results
are consistent with previous evidence: by using the ads, we underestimate the time on
the market, and dwellings with multiple ads are overpriced (therefore more subject to
price reductions).
Time on market Price change
(1) (2)
Multiple ads 125.30580∗∗∗ 0.17805∗∗∗
(0.74404) (0.00150)
Fixed effects OMI microzone OMI microzone
Temporal effects Quarter Quarter
Observations 512,246 512,246
Adjusted R2 0.06827 0.09316
Table 4: Duplicates, time on market and price changes
5 Measuring demand, supply and prices
So far we analyzed the potential measurement problems associated with the use of online
listing data for the study of housing markets, and have outlined a procedure to overcome
the main critical issues. In the second part of the paper we analyze the potential of these
data and illustrate their complementarity with traditional statistical sources.
5.1 Demand
Online listing data allow to extract information about housing demand. Indeed, online
activity leaves digital traces of human behavior. When individuals visit the webpage
of an ad, they convey information about the characteristics, the location and the price
interval of the home they are searching for. By aggregating all this information, we can
understand which area households are searching more intensely and what they are looking
for. We can observe housing demand.
Here, we know how many times website users visited the web page of an ad during
each week (clicks). This information is complementary with respect to web searches,
namely queries where the user specifies the location, characteristics and price range of
the home she is looking for.15
In principle, web searches and clicks do not convey the same information. People may
search for houses with a bundle of characteristics that cannot be found in the market.
In this case, we cannot observe clicks that map to those preferences, and so, we do not
observe the actual preferences of potential buyers. At the same time, we think that for
a large class of applications there is no loss of generality in using clicks instead of web
15 Web searches are for example used in Piazzesi, Schneider and Stroebel 2020.
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searches. For example, if an individual is really interested in buying a house, it is plausible
that it would somewhat adapt its preferences to the composition of the supply.
Clicks are also more convenient than web searches for analysis. First, home listing
websites usually allow “map search”, letting users specify a polygon on the map where
they look for a home. Extracting and aggregating this type of information about buyers
preferences is definitely hard (Piazzesi, Schneider and Stroebel, 2020; Rae, 2015), while
this problem does not arise when considering visits to web pages. Besides, clicks are
available for each listing, and they can be used to proxy the interest of potential buyers
for each home.
To show that online interest is a proxy of housing demand, we test whether online
interest for a dwelling is correlated with the time it has been on the market and the
occurrence of price revisions. If the webpage of a listed dwelling gets many clicks, it is
plausible that many households are searching for that type of houses. Therefore, our
first hypothesis is that high online interest is associated with shorter time on market.
Moreover, it is plausible that the price interval is a key searching criterion which is set
by all potential buyers. If many households search in a given price interval for a dwelling
with a particular bundle of characteristics, ceteris paribus it is less plausible to observe
downward revisions of the asking price for these dwellings. This is our second hypothesis.
We consider dwellings that have been listed since the beginning of 2016, and we keep
only those with no duplicate ads, to avoid to deal with the bias identified in Section 4.2.
We introduce a new variable ONLINT to quantify the relative interest in a particular
dwelling over its listing history with respect to all other dwellings in the same local housing
market.16 ONLINT is computed as the total number of clicks on a house, divided by
the average number of clicks in the corresponding local housing market during the same
period in which the home has been on the market. We run the following OLS regression:
log(TOMijt) = αj + ζt + β log(ONLINTijt) + δXijt + εijt,
where TOM is the time on market – measured as the number of days between the delisting
and the first listing – of dwelling i in the local housing market j delisted in quarter t.
The vector X includes the physical characteristics of the dwelling and the relative asking
price per square meter, defined as the ratio of the price per square meter of the dwelling
to the average price per square meter in the local housing market over all the period when
the dwelling was listed. We add local housing market and quarter dummies, to capture
spatial and temporal effects. In column (1) of Table 5, we report the results of this
regression. The coefficient associated to ONLINT is both statistically and economically
significant, and its sign confirms our hypothesis. According to our estimate, a 1% higher
number of clicks is on average associated with a 0.6% shorter time on market.
We now test whether online interest predicts the occurrence of price revisions. Since
price revisions likely trigger a change of online interest, we slightly change the definition
of ONLINT to avoid incurring in this issue. We compute the variable ONLINT2 as the
ratio of clicks in the first 14 days in which the dwelling was listed to the average of the
local housing market in the same period. We introduce a binary variable PRICEREF ,
that takes value one if the asking price of the dwelling was revised downward, and zero
if it was not revised or if it was revised upward.17 Then, we run the following logistic
16 We cannot use the variable CLICKS because houses are listed at different times and for different
periods.
17 We consider only the case of downward price revisions for two reasons. First, the number of upward
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regression:
log
(
pijt
1− pijt
)
= αj + ζt + βONLINT2ijt + δXijt + εijt,
where p ≡ Prob(PRICEREF = 1) and, as in the previous regression, we control for
the relative asking price per square meter, the physical characteristics of the dwelling
and local housing market and quarter dummies. We estimate that a 1% increase in the
relative number of clicks is associated with a 12% reduction in the odds of a downward
price revision (Table 5, column 2).18
Dependent variable:
TOM PRICEREV AV PRICE LIQUIDITY
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ONLINT -0.599∗∗∗
(0.002)
ONLINT2 -0.120∗∗∗
(0.010)
DEMANDt−1 0.033∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.018)
DEMANDt−2 0.048∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.018)
AV PRICEt−1 0.528∗∗∗
(0.009)
LIQUIDITYt−1 0.161∗∗∗
(0.011)
Fixed effects OMI microzone OMI microzone City City
Temporal dummies Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
Observations 201,208 200,000 8,851 8,851
R2 0.36 – 0.54 0.35
Table 5: Online interest
Next, we test if online interest predicts aggregate housing market dynamics. We build
an indicator of housing demand in each local housing market, and we expect that aggre-
gate online interest is correlated with market liquidity and house prices. Our hypothesis
is that stronger demand should lead to a more liquid market and to an increase in house
prices, as suggested in the recent literature (Carrillo, de Wit and Larson, 2015; Wu and
Brynjolfsson, 2015; van Dijk and Francke, 2017).
We construct the variable DEMAND, defined as the average number of clicks per
ad in a local housing market. Then, we test whether aggregate online attention is a
leading indicator of average asking prices (AV PRICE) and liquidity (LIQUIDITY ),
revisions is relatively small. Second, it is not always clear from the ads if a price increase is due to an
improvement of the conditions offered by the seller or to some unobserved change in the quality of the
dwelling, such as the inclusion of the garage in the sale.
18In Pangallo and Loberto (2018) we show that the relation between prices and online interest works
also the other way around. We find that a 1% higher price is associated to a 0.66% lower number of
clicks. We also show that this elasticity has a causal interpretation.
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mostly following the approach of van Dijk and Francke (2017).19 We aggregate our data
at quarterly frequency and consider two time lags for our measure of online interest. As
control variables, we consider DEMAND with one and two lags, city and time dummies.
In addition, we use socio-economic characteristics of the local housing markets from the
2011 census (X). These variables are the fraction of people with a university degree,
the unemployment rate, the fraction of owner-occupied houses and the percentage of
foreign population. Market liquidity (LIQUIDITY ) is measured as the ratio between
the number of dwellings leaving the market (delistings) and those on the market in the
same period (total number of listings). We run the following OLS regression:
log(Yijt) =αj + ζt + β1 log(DEMANDijt−1) + β2 log(DEMANDijt−2)+
β3 log(Yijt−1) + δXi + εijt,
where Yijt is AV PRICE or LIQUIDITY for the local market i, located in city j in
quarter t. The results reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 confirm that online
interest is a good leading indicator of prices and liquidity.
Therefore, clicks to webpages of the ads are an effective tool to measure housing
demand in real time and to understand buyers’ preferences. Moreover, differently from
buyers’ web searches, clicks are easy to handle, and they allow to build a measure of
demand for a specific house, not only for a neighborhood or a typology of dwellings.
5.2 Supply
Housing supply is usually defined as the total number of dwellings, independently on
whether they are on sale or not (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2018). As a consequence, an
increase in housing supply is represented by new constructions, and housing supply is
downward rigid because of the durable nature of dwellings.
In the short or medium-run this definition is not necessarily the most suitable. Indeed,
the number of houses potentially available for sale changes over time, at least for two
reasons. First, a significant fraction of home listings are currently inhabited by their
owners that are contemporaneously searching as buyers. Since the decision to move
can depend on macroeconomic developments and on the housing-market conditions, the
actual supply of dwellings changes across the cycle and is not a fixed fraction of the
stock of dwellings (Anenberg and Bayer, 2013; Ngai and Sheedy, 2020). Second, the
housing market consists of two main segments: the market for property and the market
for renting. Owners of vacant houses always have the option either to search for a buyer
or for a tenant (Krainer, 2001; Head, Lloyd-Ellis and Sun, 2014; Liberati and Loberto,
2019).
As a result, the number and type of houses that are offered for sale on the market
may not correlate with the total number of houses, and for some applications it is more
reasonable to look at listings as the housing supply.20 For example, Ngai and Sheedy
(2020) show that home sales variation is mostly driven by listings instead of change in
19 van Dijk and Francke (2017) analyze a dataset of online housing ads in the Netherlands and show
that the average number of clicks Granger-causes liquidity and prices. We confirm their findings, and
extend their analysis by considering smaller geographical aggregates – the spatial unit in their analysis
is a municipality, here we consider local housing markets.
20It is fair to say that this distinction is the same that arises in labour market statistics, in which only
people that are already working or searching actively for a job are considered inside the labour supply.
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Dependent variable:
FLOORAREA BATH GARDEN TERRACE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HEDON 0.208∗∗∗ 20.212∗∗∗ 12.996∗∗∗ 13.363∗∗∗
(0.039) (3.033) (2.321) (3.072)
Fixed effects City City City City
Temporal dummies Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
Observations 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064
R2 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.98
Table 6: Quality of listed dwellings and house prices
matching efficiency in the housing market. Moreover, also the composition of housing
supply changes over the housing market cycle.
To show that the average quality of the houses offered for sale changes with the
timing of the real estate cycle, we consider four variables that measure average quality of
listings in each local housing market at quarterly frequency. We define FLOORAREA
the logarithm of the average floor area of listings (measured in square meters); BATH is
the share of listings with at least two bathrooms; GARDEN is the share of listings having
a private garden; TERRACE is the share of listings having a terrace. To meaningfully
compute these variables, we consider only local housing market with at least 50 listings
during each quarter. As a measure of the timing of the housing market cycle in each
city we use the logarithm of hedonic house asking price index (HEDON). We consider
this variable because changes in hedonic prices are by construction uncorrelated with
changes in home average quality. Finally, to show that the composition of home supply
changes with house prices, and that it does not depend on the characteristics of newly
built houses, we consider only existing dwellings.
We estimate the following model
Yijt = αj + ζt + βHEDONjt + εijt (4)
where the dependent variable Y is one among FLOORAREA, BATH, GARDEN and
TERRACE. We add city dummies – to control for the heterogeneity of the housing
stock in the different cities – and quarter dummies. We report the results in Table 6.
Housing supply in cities with house price increases is characterized by a larger average
floor area of listed houses and greater shares of listings with at least two bathrooms, a
private garden and a terrace. Therefore, house price increases seem to be associated with
a better quality of housing supply.
5.3 Prices
As first documented by Anenberg and Laufer (2017), listing data provide several advan-
tages in measuring house prices. First, listing prices are observed in real time, while sale
prices are usually available with a significant lag. Second, buyers and sellers agree about
the sale price at the time of delisting, while the settlement date – that is the relevant
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date for computing a house price index – is usually several weeks later. Due to this lag,
listing prices can predict a standard house price index over a short term horizon.
Here, we use our dataset to first discuss a potential problem regarding the use of
listing data to measure house prices, and then to highlight a possible advantage.
The potential problem is that the growth rate of asking prices is a good approximation
for the rate of change of sale prices only if the average discount with respect to asking
prices obtained by buyers in the bargaining process were stable.21 Unfortunately, the
outside option of both buyers and sellers in the bargaining process is affected by the
general market conditions. Therefore, the average discount on asking prices changes over
time.22 As a consequence, a decrease in the discount implies that sale prices decrease less
or increase more than asking prices. Potentially, in some periods sale prices may increase
while asking prices decline.
We illustrate this issue in Figure 4(a). Between the first semester of 2015 and the
second semester of 2018, average home values (red line) declined by about 6.0%, while
asking prices (black line) diminished by 9.8%. That is consistent with the observation
that in Italy the average discount on asking prices (yellow line) – estimated by the Italian
Housing Market Survey – decreased cumulatively by 4.4 percentage points over the same
period. Thus, using asking prices to predict sale prices may require a sound estimate of
the average discount.23
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Figure 4: Prices (index 2015S1=100) and average discount (percentage points).
The possible advantage of using listing prices in place of sale prices starts from the
consideration that we do not always need to predict the short-term dynamics of sale
21 We can express the relation between asking prices, P at , and sale prices, Pt, as P
a
t = (1− dt)Pt,
where dt is the average discount. The dynamic relation between asking and sale prices is therefore given
by P at − P at−1 = Pt − Pt−1 − (Ptdt − Pt−1dt−1).
22 According to the Italian Housing Market survey the average spread between asking and effective
prices increases during market downturns and decreases during market recoveries (see figure 5 in Ap-
pendix B). Genesove and Mayer (2001) show similar evidence for the United States, and they argue that
this behavior is motivated by the fact that sellers suffer loss aversion.
23 Anenberg and Laufer (2017) discuss this issue at the end of their paper. They show that including
variables that are correlated with the discount – such as time on market – improves the forecasting
performance of listing prices.
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prices. More often, the goal is real-time identification of turning points in the house
price cycle, i.e. if house prices are going to start a lasting recovery after a decline (or a
severe downturn after a prolonged increase). Asking prices may be more reliable than sale
prices for this real-time forecasting problem. An example is provided by the dynamics of
(hedonic) asking and sale prices in the two main Italian cities, namely Rome and Milan
(Figure 4(b)). In 2016 sale prices increased, after a prolonged decline, both in Rome and
Milan. Then, in Milan house prices continued to increase, while in Rome prices started
to fall in 2017, as they were before 2016. Looking to asking prices it would have been
possible to predict in real time that the 2016 sale price increase in Rome was temporary
(asking prices were falling by almost 5% year-on-year), while in Milan the resilience of
the recovery was confirmed by the increase in asking prices.
Despite this evidence is almost anecdotal given the small sample size,24 we think
that the higher reliability of asking prices for real-time identification of turning points
in the house price cycle is a more general phenomenon, for the following reasons. First,
when considering hedonic price indexes, listing data provide rich information about the
physical characteristics of the housing units, while transaction data often contain little
information. Second, the larger volume of listings compared to sales allows to take into
account a larger portion of the housing market, including homes that may be sold in the
near future, thus smoothing short-term trends. Third, and finally, the short-run volatility
of sale prices can be driven by the average discount. Indeed, Figure 4(b) shows that, when
the average discount stabilized, asking and sales started again having similar dynamics.
6 Conclusion
We study a large dataset of housing ads, published on the main online portal for real-
estate services in Italy. We provide a comprehensive analysis of the strengths and weak-
nesses of these data for the study of housing markets. The main issue is the existence of
a substantial share of duplicate ads, which can lead to a misrepresentation of the volume
and composition of housing supply. As examples of the potential of these data, we focus
on three new applications on housing demand, supply and prices.
Although our analysis is of course specific to the dataset we use, we think that our
insights could be employed more generally as economists increasingly rely on online list-
ings websites. For example, the issue of duplicates is likely to affect all listings websites
that have no incentive to control proliferation of duplicates, e.g. because they profit from
the number of ads rather than from data quality. In the case of home listings websites,
this problem is exacerbated by open mandate agreements: in all countries where these
agreements are possible, duplicate ads could arise from different agencies, and we find it
unlikely that website administrators could correct for this bias.
Our paper provides a method to identify these duplicates and extract useful economic
information on behavior of sellers in housing markets from this “data cleaning” procedure.
24We are unable to consider more cities as the sale price index provided by ISTAT is only available at
the city level for Milan, Rome and Turin, and in the case of Turin it is extremely noisy.
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A Data
Listings. The source data which we obtained from Immobiliare.it are contained in weekly
files. Starting from these snapshots, we construct six datasets. The main dataset is the
one with unique ads. Three datasets track the weekly change of asking prices, visits and
uses of the form to contact the agency that is shown on each ad (we do not use information
on contacts in this paper; in Pangallo and Loberto (2018) we show that it provides
equivalent information to the number of visits). The last two datasets contain information
about real estate agents and the the list of hash codes of the pictures associated to each
ad. The information available for each ad is reported in Table 7.
Type of data Variables
Numerical Price, floor area, rooms, bathrooms
Categorical Property type, furniture, kitchen type, heating type,
maintenance status, balcony, terrace, floor, air condi-
tioning, energy class, basement, utility room
Related to the building Elevator, type of garden, garage, porter, building cate-
gory
Contractual Foreclosure auction, contract type
Related to the seller Publisher type (private citizen or real estate agency),
agency name and address
Visual Hash codes of the pictures, pictures count
Geographical Longitude, latitude, address
Related to the ad Visits, contacts
Temporal Ad posted, ad removed, ad modified
Textual Description
Table 7: Information contained in the database provided by Immobiliare.it. For a complete
description of the meaning of the variables, see Loberto, Luciani and Pangallo (2018). Italics
indicates that if variables are missing, we perform semantic analysis on the textual description
of the ads to recover missing information.
House prices. OMI, a branch of the Italian Tax Office, twice per year disseminates
estimates of minimum and maximal home values in euros per square meter, Pl and Ph,
at very granular level. home values are available for all OMI micro-zones – which are
uniform socio-economic areas roughly corresponding to neighborhoods – in Italian cities.
Pl and Ph are estimated based on a limited sample of home sales and valuations by real
estate experts. Further information is available at https://www.agenziaentrate.gov.
it/wps/content/Nsilib/Nsi/Schede/FabbricatiTerreni/omi.
We define the average home value in neighborhood (OMI micro-zone) j as P¯j =
Plj+Phj
2
. The average home values at city level are estimated as a simple average of the
P¯j. For further aggregation above the city level, we compute weighted averages of the
cities’ average home values. As weights, we use the stock of houses measured in the
2011 Census. OMI estimates are not designed for statistical purposes, and the index we
construct must not be considered as equivalent to a quality-adjusted price index.
In Italy, quality-adjusted (hedonic) house price indexes are disseminated by Istat, but
their reference area is not consistent with our listing data, apart from three city-level
indexes referred to the main Italian cities: Rome, Milan and Turin. We use these indexes
for house prices in Rome and Milan in section 5.3.
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Home sales. Quarterly data about the volume of home sales in each city are dissemi-
nated by OMI.
Italian Housing Market Survey. The Italian Housing Market Survey is a quarterly
survey that has been conducted by Banca d’Italia, OMI and Tecnoborsa since 2009. It
covers a sample of real estate agents and reports their opinions regarding the current
and expected course of home sales, price trends, time on market and terms of trade.
See https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/sondaggio-abitazioni/ for fur-
ther information.
Census data. We retrieve detailed information on socio-economic characteristics and
stock of buildings in OMI micro-zones from the 2011 Census. Istat census tracts are much
smaller than OMI micro-zones (indeed, there are approximately 400,000 Istat census
tracts over the Italian territory, as compared to 27,000 OMI micro-zones) and do not
necessarily coincide with them. We perform spatial matching of the polygons representing
the tracts and the micro-zones and impute the Istat variables to the OMI micro-zones
according to the overlap percentage of the polygons. For example, if an Istat census tract
comprises 2,000 housing units and it straddles two OMI micro-zones, such that there is a
50% overlap for both, we impute 1,000 housing units to each of the two OMI micro-zones.
B Additional tables and figures
Variable Percentile Mean
5 25 50 75 95
Total population 270.2 1604.5 4473.0 10592.2 27589.3 8049.8
Total households 108.6 681.8 1874.5 4582.2 12226.4 3528.5
Total housing units 152.6 896.5 2388.0 5527.2 13750.6 4166.2
Share of owner-occupied 47.2 63.1 70.2 75.8 82.5 68.3
Average house value (e/m2) 765.6 1170.0 1532.5 2121.7 3339.0 1757.1
Average asking price (e/m2) 878.4 1290.1 1784.4 2453.8 4025.1 2013.5
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of local markets.
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C Construction of the housing units dataset
In this section we fully describe the algorithm we implemented to remove the duplicate
ads. In Loberto, Luciani and Pangallo (2018) we also show the pseudo-codes of the
procedure.
C.1 Pre-processing of the ads dataset
We want to use the description of the housing unit to identify potential duplicates, but
we first need to transform the text into a numeric vector using semantic analysis. There
exist standard algorithms in natural language processing that accomplish this task by
considering the multiplicity of the words, such as bag-of-words (Harris, 1954), but we
cannot use these algorithms here. Indeed, two different real estate agents can describe
the same dwelling using different words or sentences and this makes standard measures
of distance among texts useless. For this reason we resort to the recent Paragraph Vector
(or doc2vec) algorithm proposed by Le and Mikolov (2014), an algorithm based on neural
networks that allows to represent a document by a N -dimensional vector taking into
account both the order and the semantic of the words.
We also convert the class of some variables to alleviate the issue of misreporting
dwellings characteristics. Indeed, two different agents can report information partially
different but not completely at odds regarding the characteristics of the same housing
unit. Consider for example the case of maintenance status: one real estate agent can
report that the dwelling must be completely renovated, while the other agent writes that
only a partial renovation is necessary. However, it is not plausible that the second agent
says that the housing unit is new. As maintenance status takes only 4 possible ordered
categories, we convert the categorical variable to an integer variable that takes value
from 1 to 4 and a greater value means a better maintenance status. In this way when
we compare two dwellings we take the absolute difference between the two variables and
we can easily allow for partial matching. We do this operation for several other ordered
categorical variables other than maintenance status: energy class, garage, type of garden,
type of kitchen. We report the details in Table 9.
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Variable Original levels Transformation
Garage Missing, Single, Double Integer: Missing = 0, Single = 1, Double = 2
Garden Missing, Shared, Private
Integer: Missing = 0, Shared = 1, Private =
2
Maintenance status
To renovate, Good,
Excellent, New
Integer: To renovate = 0, Good = 1,
Excellent = 2, New = 3
Kitchen Type
Kitchenette, Small eat-in
kitchen, Large eat-in
kitchen
Integer: Kitchenette = 0, Small eat-in
kitchen = 1, Large eat-in kitchen = 2
Energy Class A+, A, B, C, D, E, F, G
Integer: A+ = 0, A = 0, B = 1, C = 2, D =
3, E = 4, F = 5, G = 6
address Text of the address
Vector of words in the address (removing
prepositions and articles)
Table 9: Variable transformations for the deduplication algorithm (classification tree).
C.2 Identification of duplicates
We identify duplicate ads based on pairwise comparison, meaning that we compare each
ad with all other ads that are potentially duplicates.
First of all, in order to reduce the computational complexity of the pairwise approach,
for each ad we identify its potential duplicates. We define as potential duplicates those
ads that refer to dwellings distant less than 400 meters and with a difference in asking
price lower than 25% in absolute value.25 In this way we end up with a long list of pairs
of ads and for each of them we have to decide if they are duplicates.
We classify each pair of ads as duplicates (TRUE) or distinct housing units (FALSE)
based on a supervised classification tree. The algorithm adopted here is the C5.0 classifi-
cation tree proposed by Quinlan (1993) (http://www.rulequest.com/see5-info.html).
This algorithm handles autonomously missing data, is faster than similar algorithms and
allows for boosting.
For each pair of ads we provide to the algorithm a vector of predictors (covariates
in the jargon of machine learning) and based on this information the classification tree
returns the probability that the two ads are duplicates. We consider a pair of ads to be
duplicates if the estimated probability is greater than 0.5.
Among the predictors we consider: floor area, price, floor, energy class, garage, gar-
den type, air conditioning, heating type, maintenance status, kitchen type, number of
bathrooms, number of rooms, janitor, utility room, location, elevator, balcony and ter-
race. For continuous variables, such as price and floor area, we use both the percentage
and the absolute difference; for geolocation, we take the distance in meters between the
geographical coordinates of the two dwellings. For binary variables, such as elevator or
basement, the predictor is a dummy variable, that takes value equal to 1 if both ads
share the same characteristic. For discrete ordered multinomial variables (such as main-
tenance status) we consider instead different degrees of similarity, by taking the absolute
difference between the two variables.
We also use the distance between the textual description of the two ads as a predictor.
For this variable we consider two different measures, depending on whether the ads are
posted by the same agency or not. In the first case we use the Levenshtein distance,
25The difference in asking price is computed dividing the absolute difference between the two asking
prices with the lowest of the two. Since this condition can be quite restrictive when considering dwellings
with low asking prices, we consider as potential duplicates also those ads with absolute difference lower
than 50,000 euro.
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Observations Duplicates Precision Recall F-measure
Different agency 8296 3711 0.930 0.924 0.927
Same agency 9844 1850 0.952 0.946 0.949
Precision = TP/(TP+FP). Recall = TP/(TP+FN). F-measure =
2*(Precision*Recall)/(Precision+Recall). TP = true positive; FP = false positive; FN = false negative.
Table 10: Assessment of C5.0 models
otherwise we compute the cosine similarities between the vectors produced using the
Paragraph Vector algorithm.
We implement two different C5.0 models, depending on whether the ads are posted
by the same agency or not. This choice is motivated by the observation that, when an
agency posts two ads for the same dwelling, the characteristics in the ads are almost
equal. On the contrary, when the ads are posted by different agencies (or by a private
user) sometimes you can tell they refer to the same dwelling only thanks to the pictures
on the website. This means that duplicate ads are less similar if posted by different
agencies than if created by the same agency. As a consequence, a unique model for both
cases could lead to an excess of ads considered as duplicates among those published by
the same agency.
C5.0 is a supervised method that requires an initial training sample of pairs of ads
of which we know with certainty whether they are duplicates or not. We construct
two different training samples, one for each model, by manually checking the ads on the
website, in particular comparing the pictures. The training sample for the ads of different
agencies is made of 8296 pairs of ads; among them 3711 are duplicates (true positive,
TP). The training sample for the ads of the same agency is made of 9844 observations and
1850 are duplicates. These samples are constructed by iterating the following steps: (i)
estimation of the model based on the initial training sample; (ii) out-of-sample validation
of the models; (iii) using the results of the out-of-sample exercise to increase the training
sample. This three step approach is repeated several times, until we reach a sufficiently
low misclassification error.
In order to assess the performance of the two models we randomly split each training
sample in two different sub-samples: the first one (90% of the observations) is used
to estimate the models, the second one (10% of the observations) is used for the out-
of-sample assessment of the classification performance. We repeat the operation 1,000
times and we evaluate the performance based on average results. Since the number of true
negatives (ads that are not duplicates) is much larger than the number of true positives,
using the classic accuracy rate can be misleading about the actual performance of the
models. For this reason we consider measures of classification performance that do not
rely on the number of true negatives, namely: precision, recall and F-measure.26
We show the results in Table 10. As expected, the model for ads of the same agency
is more precise than the one for ads of different agencies. As we said before, ads posted
from the same agency and related to the same dwelling have almost all characteristics
in common, therefore it is easier to identify them. However, as the F-measure is equal
26The precision rate is defined as the ratio between the number of true positives and the sum of true
and false positives; it thus measures how precise a classifier is in classifying true matches. The recall rate
is defined as the ratio of true positives over the sum of true positives and false negatives; it measures the
proportion of true matches that have been classified correctly. As there is a trade-off between precision
and recall, we consider also a third additional measure, the F-measure, that calculates the harmonic
mean between precision and recall.
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to .927, also the C5.0 model for ads of different agencies has a quite good classification
performance. We should remark that the variables used in the two models are not the
same and have been selected in order to maximize the F-measure.27 We report the set of
variables for each model in Table 11.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Description of the variable
price abs Yes Yes Absolute difference between asking prices
price per Yes Yes Percentage difference between asking prices
floorarea abs Yes Yes Absolute difference between floor area
floorarea per Yes Yes Percentage difference between floor area
floor Yes Yes Absolute difference between floor level (integer)
distance Yes Yes Absolute distance in meters between households
address Yes Yes
Indicator function: 1 if the two addresses have at least one
common word
isnew Yes Yes
Indicator function: 1 if at least one of the ads refers to a
new house
balcony Yes No Indicator function: 1 if the feature balcony is the same
distdays1 Yes Yes
Number of days between the dates the ads have been
added
status Yes Yes Absolute difference (integer) between categories
elevator Yes No Indicator function: 1 if the feature elevator is the same
energy class Yes No Absolute difference (integer) between categories
isdetached Yes No
Indicator function: 1 if at least one of the ads refers to a
detached or semi-detached house
bathrooms Yes No
Absolute difference between number of bathrooms
(integer)
heating type Yes No
Indicator function: 1 if the feature heating type is the
same
distcontent1 Yes No
Cosine distance of vectors (Paragraph vectors)
representing textual descriptions
distcontent2 No Yes Levenshtein distance between textual descriptions
rooms Yes No Absolute difference between number of rooms (integer)
garage Yes Yes Absolute difference (integer) between categories
garden Yes No Absolute difference (integer) between categories
utility room Yes No Indicator function: 1 if the feature utility room is the same
janitor Yes No Indicator function: 1 if the feature janitor is the same
basement Yes No Indicator function: 1 if the basement janitor is the same
is detached Yes No Indicator function: 1 if the basement janitor is the same
pricemq abs No Yes Absolute difference in the asking price per square meter
pricemq min Yes Yes Minimum of the two asking prices per square meter
pricemq max No Yes Maximum of the two asking prices per square meter
Table 11: Variables for the classification trees
27We started for both models with only five predictors: percentage difference between prices, absolute
difference between prices, percentage difference between floor areas, absolute difference between floor
areas, difference between floors. Then we added each candidate predictor one-by-one updating the initial
model only if the variable provided an improvement of the F-measure (computed on the out-of-sample
observations in a Monte Carlo experiment with 1,000 draws). We repeated the operation iteratively as
long as there was no performance improvement from adding an additional predictor.
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C.3 Creation of clusters of duplicates and information aggrega-
tion
Once we have identified the pairs of ads that are duplicates, we need a procedure to
cluster all ads that are considered related to the same housing unit and to aggregate the
information in the ads. Here, we follow a standard procedure in the computer science
literature (Naumann and Herschel, 2010; Christen, 2012)
Let us suppose for example that we have only three ads: A, B and C. It is possible that
the pairs (A,B) and (B,C) are considered as duplicates, but (A,C) is not. How should we
manage this case? A simple solution is to assume transitivity: this means that since A is
a duplicate of B and B is a duplicate of C, we assume that C is a duplicate of A and all
these ads are considered related to the same dwelling. However, this approach can bring
several issues: let us suppose for example that the probability of being duplicates for the
pair (A,B) is 0.95 and the probability for the pair (B,C) is 0.51. How reliable is in this
case the assumption of transitivity?
Here we abstract from the assumption of transitivity and we decide whether a cluster
of ads refers to the same housing unit based on a measure of internal similarity of the
cluster. In order to illustrate our approach we consider a simple example. Assume we
have ten ads, we compute for each of the 45 possible pairs the probability that they are
duplicates and we remove all pairs with probability smaller than 0.5. The remaining pairs
are shown in Table 12.
id.x 1 1 2 4 4 4 6 6 7 9
id.y 7 8 3 6 10 5 9 10 8 10
Prob. 0.92 0.81 0.73 0.98 1.00 0.52 0.87 0.70 0.93 0.86
Table 12: Example of clusters
Starting from the results of the pairwise classification step in Table 12, we represent
the information as a graph, in order to form clusters. The output of this step is represented
in Figure 6(a). The identifiers of the ads (here assumed to be integers between 1 and
10) are the nodes of the graph. Two nodes are connected if the probability that they are
duplicates is greater than 0.5.
The tuples of ads (2,3) and (1,7,8) are considered to refer to two distinct dwellings,
as each of the ads in the tuple is a duplicate of all the other ads. The troubles come
with the tuple (4,5,6,9,10). Here, differently than before, it is not true that each ad is a
duplicate of all the others. In particular this sub-graph only has 6 edges, while in order
to be defined as a fully connected graph we would need 10 edges. More generally, an
indirect graph is said to be fully connected if the number of edges is equal to N(N−1)
2
,
where N is the number of the nodes of the graph (in our case the number of ads).
The tuples (2,3) and (1,7,8) are clearly fully connected, while the tuple (4,5,6,9,10)
is not. We consider a cluster as representing a single housing unit if it is a group of ads
with a sufficiently high internal similarity, i.e. the number of edges is at least a fraction
5/6 of the maximum number of edges that we can have in the cluster. At each step we
verify for each cluster if this condition is verified or not; if it is not satisfied we remove
the weakest edge, that we define as the one with the lowest duplicate probability among
those in the cluster.
Since for the tuple (4,5,6,9,10) the condition is not satisfied, we delete the weakest link,
that in this case is represented by the edge between nodes (4) and (5), whose associated
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(a) Step 1 (b) Step 2
Figure 6: Clustering of the ads
probability is 0.52. The new set of clusters after this operation is represented in Figure
6(b), in which the node (5) is now considered as referring to a distinct housing unit. If
we look at the new tuple (4,6,9,10), we see that it has 5 edges out of 6 possible edges.
Since our internal similarity condition is satisfied, we consider also this last tuple as a
distinct dwelling.
Summing up our example, we started with 10 ads and we ended up with only 4
housing units. Based on this approach, we estimate for our training week (ads visible in
21 December 2016) that real dwellings were only 78% of the total ads (130 thousands
housing units out of 168 thousands ads).
Once we have created the clusters of ads identifying different dwellings, an additional
issue that must be considered is to combine the information contained in multiple ads
related to the same dwelling. Here, we adopt as a general rule that for each characteristic
we take the one with highest absolute frequency. We deviate from this rule in the case
of latitude and longitude (we compute the mean across the coordinates of all ads) and
when we compute the dates of entry and exit of the dwelling into the housing market (for
the entry we take the date of creation of the first ad associated to the dwelling, for the
exit we consider the date of removal from the database of the last ad).28
C.4 Time machine approach
The approach delineated above has the limit to be computationally unfeasible once the
number of ads rises, because the number of pairwise comparisons increases exponentially.
For this reason the procedure described in the previous section will be applied using an
iterative approach (“time machine approach”).
We process the ads progressively as soon as they are published on the website. At
the first iteration of the process we run the deduplication procedure on all ads that have
been added before the end of the first week we are considering. Once we apply the
deduplication procedure, we end up with a new dataset where each row corresponds in
28An additional exception to the general rule is done for asking prices. In this case we take the most
frequent observation only among ads that have not been removed.
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principle to a unique dwelling and the characteristics of these housing units are derived
from those of the associated ads.
At the second iteration we take as an input the datasets of ads and housing units of
the first week. We check for duplicates only among the new ads added during the second
week or the ads posted before but for which the price or other characteristics have been
updated during the second week. For all these ads we look for duplicates both among new
or updated ads and the dataset of housing units from the first week. The ads that are
updated are preliminarily removed from the dataset of dwellings (that must be updated
accordingly).
The decision on whether the ads are duplicates is still based on a pairwise comparison,
but now we can have pairs with two ads or pairs with one ad and one housing unit. Once
we compute for each pair the probability that they are duplicates we cluster the results
as explained in Section C.3. Differently than before, we impose the additional condition
that in each cluster there can be at most one housing unit that was already identified in
the previous week. This additional condition is necessary to avoid that clusters of ads
that have been considered as referring to different dwellings in the past processing can
be considered now as duplicates, because there are new ads that are potential duplicates
of both of them.
C.5 Additional controls
After the deduplication process we make additional controls on the dataset to address for
potential errors in the data. First of all we keep only the dwellings that have been on the
market for at least two weeks. Then, we drop from the dataset those dwellings for which
the price is not sufficiently consistent with the characteristics of the housing units. In this
way we are also able to identify foreclosure auctions that were not previously identified,
because for example the auction was not reported in the textual description .
Our approach consists of running a hedonic regression, estimating for each dwelling
the ratio between actual and predicted price and eliminating the housing units with a
ratio between asking and predicted price lower than 0.5 or higher than 1.5.29
29We keep a relatively large range because the hedonic regression is limited to a small set of housing unit
characteristics, those less affected by missing data issues. In this step we impute missing characteristics
for each housing unit using the approach proposed by Honaker, King and Blackwell (https://gking.
harvard.edu/amelia).
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